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Neo re pub li can ism and Its Crit ics
De lib era tion, Rheto ric and Re pub li can Free dom
CAMIL-ALEXANDRU PÂRVU
In this ar ti cle, I aim to as sess the va lid ity of some of the re cent skep ti cal pro-
nounce ments con cern ing the pros pects of a neo re pub li can pro gram in con tem po-
rary po liti cal the ory. Voiced by au thors such as Robert Goodin, Geof frey Bren nan, 
Loren Lo masky and oth ers, the ver dict is that the so-called re pub li can re vival in po-
liti cal the ory has al ready re ceded, and with out hav ing pro duced any sig nifi cant 
con cep tual or nor ma tive in roads. As rooted in, but ul ti mately dis tinct from the in-
tel lec tual his to ri ans’ still valid re search pro gram – that of re cast ing the sources of 
mod ern po liti cal thought in its re pub li can, not only Enlight en ment and lib eral line-
age – the theo reti cal and in sti tu tional di men sions of neo re pub li can ism as a rele-
vant, ro bust con tem po rary po liti cal ide ol ogy are viewed by these crit ics as 
un re ward ing and, at the end of the day, ei ther dan ger ous or fruit less.
Re pub li can ism as a po liti cal the ory, or neo re pub li can ism, aims to ad vance a se-
ries of po liti cal and ana lyti cal po si tions per ti nent to the com plex chal lenges of con-
tem po rary so cie ties, and has been in spired by the work of the in tel lec tual his to ri ans 
such as Quen tin Skin ner1 or G. A. Po cock2. There is no wide spread con sen sus on a ca-
noni cal set of con tem po rary works, yet po liti cal theo rists such as Philip Pettit3, Frank 
Michel man4, Cass Sun stein5, Rich ard Dag ger6 or Mau ri zio Vi roli7 have re cently built 
pow er ful ac counts that de code and re con fig ure in a po liti cal theo reti cal con text 
some of the nor ma tive and in sti tu tional im pli ca tions of the re pub li can ideal.
Their con cep tions elabo rate on the re pub li can idea of free dom as it re emerged 
in the works of Skin ner or Po cock, yet aim at do ing so in a clearly con tem po rary 
con text; in other words, their goal is re lated, yet dis tinct from the pro ject of re con-
sid er ing the re pub li can roots of po liti cal mod er nity, which has been the in tel lec-
tual task of many schol ars of the his tory of po liti cal thought8. The con tem po rary 
1 Quentin SKINNER, ”The Republican Idea of Political Liberty”, in Gisela BOCK, Maurizio 
VIROLI, Quentin SKINNER (eds.), Machiavelli and Republicanism, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1990, pp. 293-310; Quentin SKINNER, Liberty Before Liberalism, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1998.
2 J.G.A. POCOCK, The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic 
Republican Tradition, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1975.
3 Philip PETTIT, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1997.
4 Frank MICHELMAN, ”Law’s Republic”, Yale Law Journal, vol. 97, no. 2, 1988, pp. 1493-1537. 
5 Cass R. SUNSTEIN, ”Beyond the Republican Revival”, Yale Law Journal, vol. 97, no. 8, 1988, 
pp. 1539-1590.
6 Richard DAGGER, Civic Virtues. Rights, Citizenship and Republican Liberalism, Oxford Uni-
ver sity Press, Oxford, 1997.
7 Maurizio VIROLI, Republicanism, trans. by A. Shugaar, Hill and Wang, New York, 2002; see 
also, Iseult HONOHAN, Civic Republicanism, Routledge, London, 2002.
8 Quentin SKINNER, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 2 vols., Cambridge Uni-
ver sity Press, Cambridge, 1978; IDEM, Visions of Politics, 3 vols., Cambridge University Press, 
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rele vance of neo re pub li can ism as a po liti cal the ory1 de pends on it ad dress ing the 
in ter ro ga tions and the in sti tu tional com plex ity of our world, in a way that is dis-
tinct from both lib er al ism and, say, com mu ni tari an ism or na tion al ism. The chal-
lenge for neo re pub li can ism2, in other words, is to elu ci date and ad dress 
con tem po rary prob lems in ways that are po liti cally rele vant and in de pend ent, no-
ta bly from lib er al ism.
Among the re cent criti cism of a re pub li can po liti cal the ory, sev eral con tri bu tions 
are sin gled out in this ar ti cle. One is Robert Goodin’s ar ti cle on the ”Fo lie Ré pub li-
caine”3; an other skep ti cal as sess ment is ad vanced in Loren Lo masky and Geof frey 
Bren nan’s ar ti cle ”Against Re viv ing Re pub li can ism”4. To sum up the cri tique, in 
the words of Lo masky and Bren nan:
”Ei ther re pub li can ism is nonthreat en ing be cause it is lit tle more than a 
some what ar chaic rhe tori cal skin for a body of mod ern lib er al ism or, if sub-
stan tively dis tanc ing it self from lib eral pre cepts, is overtly op pres sive to a 
trou bling de gree”.
In other words, re pub li can ism ei ther fails to dis tance it self con cep tu ally and 
nor ma tively from the con tem po rary au thor ity of lib er al ism, or, if it suc ceeds, the 
re pub li can prin ci ples and val ues that it pro motes turn out to be op pres sive and 
dan ger ous.
I ar gue that con tem po rary re pub li cans should, cer tainly, take se ri ously both 
criti cisms. Yet by em pha siz ing the dif fer ence be tween a neo-Ro man con cept of 
free dom as non-domi na tion and the lib eral con cept of free dom as non-in ter fer-
ence, they tend to ig nore the other im por tant risk that neo re pub li can ism faces: 
namely, the risk of lean ing to ward a strongly par tici pa tory and de lib era tive ver-
sion of de moc racy. In other words, while dis tanc ing them selves from lib eral po liti-
cal the ory, they should re sist the temp ta tions to dis solve neo re pub li can ism into 
de lib era tive de moc racy.
I con tend, there fore, that much of the criti cism ap plies rather to those po liti cal 
theo ries that are, in deed, some times viewed as re pub li can, or as em body ing the 
core re pub li can in sights, but which are in fact strongly de lib era tive or strongly 
iden ti tarian/com mu ni tarian ver sions of par tici pa tory de moc racy. This means 
that such ac counts tend to con tinue to mis con strue the core val ues of a re pub li can 
po liti cal the ory – and es pe cially the na ture and role of the re quire ment for po liti cal 
par tici pa tion and de lib era tion. I try to enlarge the con text of re pub li can po liti cal 
Cambridge, 2002; Anabel BRETT, James TULLY (eds.), Rethinking the Foundations of Modern 
Political Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006.
1 Recent work on the relevance of republicanism as a political theory for contemporary so-
ciety include Daniel WEINSTOCK, Christian NADEAU (eds.), Republicanism: History, Theory and 
Practice, Frank Cass, London, 2004; Iseult HONOHAN, Jeremy JENNINGS (eds.), Republicanism 
in Theory and Practice, Routledge, 2006; and Cecile LABORDE, John MAYNOR (eds.), Republicanism 
and Political Theory, Blackwell, Oxford, 2008.
2 Philip PETTIT, Frank LOVETT, ”Neorepublicanism: A Normative and Institutional Re-
search Program”, forthcoming, Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 12, 2009 (review in advan-
ce, first posted online on November 14, 2008).
3 Robert E. GOODIN, ”Folie Républicaine”, Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 6, 2003, 
pp. 55-76.
4 Geoffrey BRENNAN, Loren LOMASKY, ”Against Reviving Republicanism”, Politics, 
Philosophy & Economics, vol. 5, no. 2, 2006, pp. 221-252.
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the ory by point ing to the role of rhe tori cal per sua sion within the main neo-Ro man 
in tel lec tual and po liti cal tra di tion that in forms much of con tem po rary re pub li can 
schol ar ship. This ideal of rhe tori cal per sua sion finds it self at odds with the ra tion-
al is tic and mor al iz ing char ac ter of most of the cur rent theo riz ing of pub lic de lib-
era tion, sig nal ing thus a cru cial dis tinc tion be tween con tem po rary re pub li can 
po liti cal the ory and de lib era tive par tici pa tory de moc ratic ac counts.
My ar gu ment is, thus, that the con cep tual ef fort to un ravel re pub li can free-
dom should not ob scure the fact that cur rent par tici pa tory de lib era tive de moc-
ratic theo ries re main in a prob lem atic re la tion ship with what I un der stand to be 
the pro gram of neo re pub li can ism. In the first part of this ar ti cle, I ex pose briefly 
the main ele ments of a dis tinctly re pub li can con cep tion of free dom, as put for-
ward by Philip Pettit and Quen tin Skin ner. Then, I de tail the cri tique sub mit ted by 
Goodin, Lo masky and Bren nan. In the last part, I aim to show how this criti cism, 
while ade quate when di rected against a strongly par tici pa tory form of de lib era-
tive de moc ratic the ory, is not simi larly rele vant when di rected against neo re pub li-
can ism it self. There ex ists a neo-Ro man con text of po liti cal per sua sion based on 
rhe tori cal de lib era tions, which cur rent ver sions of de lib era tive de moc racy ei ther 
ig nore or down right re ject.
It is cer tain that both the in tel lec tual his to ri ans (Skin ner, Po cock) and the po-
liti cal theo rists (Pettit) are ada mant to dis place the foun da tional role that lib er al-
ism plays for po liti cal mod er nity, as well as its ver sion of the con tem po rary 
vo cabu lary of in di vid ual rights, free dom and citi zen ship. Their work cer tainly can-
not be re duced to the ac counts on the ideal of lib erty; nev er the less, this ideal has 
such an es sen tial part and such core sig nifi cance in the cur rent schol ar ship that it 
calls for a suc cinct de scrip tion in the fol low ing sec tion.
Re pub li can Free dom
Both the in tel lec tual his to ri ans and the con tem po rary po liti cal theo rists in ter-
ested in a ”re pub li can re vival”, or par tici pat ing in a ”re pub li can turn”, have been 
anx ious to es cape or tran scend the ca noni cal dis tinc tion be tween a lib erty of the 
An cients, and one of the Mod erns, a dis tinc tion fa mously out lined in the be gin-
ning of the 19th cen tury by Ben ja min Con stant1. They have also tried to con cep tu-
ally make place for a third no tion of (re pub li can) lib erty, next to the two iden ti fied 
by Isaiah Ber lin, that is, a posi tive lib erty and a nega tive lib erty2. For a long time, 
the dif fi cult chal lenge for re pub li can think ers has been thus to avoid be com ing 
pris on ers of such com monly used di choto mous cate go ries, which – ac cord ing to 
them – mis con strue their po si tions and con cep tual choices, and nul lify a long and 
repu ta ble tra di tion of po liti cal thought that can and should still in spire and in-
form the cur rent de bates on the re sources of nor ma tiv ity in po liti cal the ory.
1 Benjamin CONSTANT, ”The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns” 
(”De la liberté des anciens comparée à celle des modernes”), in Benjamin CONSTANT, Political 
Writings, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, ed. by Biancamaria Fontana, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 307-329.
2 Isaiah BERLIN, ”Two Concepts of Liberty”, in Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1969.
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Re pub li can free dom, as de vel oped in these writ ings, is nei ther the ”lib erty of 
the An cients”, nor the posi tive lib erty de scribed by Ber lin. But while it is dis tinct 
from posi tive lib erty, it is not – and can not be re duced, ei ther, to – lib erty as non-in-
ter fer ence, nega tive lib erty: rather, it is free dom as non-domi na tion, the ”third con-
cept of lib erty”, that neo re pub li cans have in mind when they claim a dis tinc tive 
in tel lec tual and po liti cal iden tity, if not a full-blown po liti cal ide ol ogy.
In what fol lows, I sum ma rize two ma jor con tri bu tions to the ef fort of re claim-
ing the au then tic ity and rele vance of the re pub li can con cep tion of free dom. With 
a promi nent place in re cent schol ar ship, Philip Pettit and Quen tin Skin ner in vite 
us to un der stand lib erty as non-domi na tion as a co her ent ideal, one which has its 
roots in the Ro man re pub li can an tithe sis be tween the no tions of lib er tas and domi-
na tio. In the de scrip tion of Pettit,
”Domi na tion, as I un der stand it here, is ex em pli fied by the re la tion ship 
of mas ter to slave or mas ter to ser vant. Such a re la tion ship means, at the 
limit, that the domi nat ing party can in ter fere on an ar bi trary ba sis with the 
choices of the domi nated: can in ter fere, in par ticu lar, on the ba sis of an in ter-
est or an opin ion that need not be shared by the per son af fected. The domi-
nat ing party can prac tise in ter fer ence, then, at will and with im pu nity: they 
do not have to seek any one’s leave and they do not have to in cur any scru-
tiny or pen alty”1.
Cru cial to the task of Pettit, as we have seen, is to ex plain the dif fer ence be-
tween the re pub li can free dom as non-domi na tion and both lib erty as non-in ter fer-
ence (nega tive lib erty) and lib erty as self-mas tery (posi tive free dom). At the same 
time, he aims to of fer a nor ma tively sound ac count of the re pub li can ideal that can 
meas ure up to the ap peal that the lib eral ide als of free dom have en joyed in mod ern 
times. In other words, this is not a task of con cep tual analy sis ex clu sively: for ana-
lyti cal pur poses, a con cept of lib erty can have solid ten ets and prove a re spect able 
topic for aca demic de bate. Yet the stake of a neo re pub li can po liti cal the ory, again, it 
so trans form such a con cep tual ac count into a pow er ful ideal and to in te grate lib-
erty as non-domi na tion into its lar ger con cep tual and nor ma tive theo reti cal frame-
work. Ul ti mately, neo re pub li can ism aims to speak to its con tem po rar ies, to ad dress 
their po liti cal and in sti tu tional con texts and their nor ma tive pre dica ments.
As a ro bust po liti cal ideal, the re pub li can free dom as non-domi na tion spans 
over a lar ger field than ei ther nega tive or posi tive lib erty: as we shall see, its con di-
tions of pos si bil ity in clude a sub stan tial set of fur ther ele ments2. But while it may 
con tain to a cer tain de gree both self-mas tery and non-in ter fer ence, non-domi na-
tion is clearly, ac cord ing to Pettit, con cep tu ally in de pend ent from both of them.
In Pettit’s ac count, domi na tion and in ter fer ence are sepa rated at least in as 
much as non-domi na tion en tails se cur ing, over time, the con di tions of non-in ter fer-
ence. But on a more com plex level, Pettit claims, ”it is pos si ble to have domi na tion 
with out in ter fer ence and in ter fer ence with out domi na tion”. When he il lus trates 
the for mer situa tion, the neo-Ro man re pub li can in tel lec tual roots are visi ble:
”I may be domi nated by an other—for ex am ple, to go to the ex treme 
case, I may be the slave of an other—with out ac tu ally be ing in ter fered with 
1 Philip PETTIT, Republicanism...cit., p. 22.
2 See Christian LIST, ”Republican Freedom and Rule of Law”, Politics, Philosophy and Econo-
mics, vol. 5, no. 2, 2006, pp. 201-220.
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in any of my choices. It may just hap pen that my mas ter is of a kindly and 
non-in ter fer ing dis po si tion. Or it may just hap pen that I am cun ning or fawn-
ing enough to be able to get away with do ing what ever I like. I suf fer domi-
na tion to the ex tent that I have a mas ter; I en joy non-in ter fer ence to the ex tent 
that that mas ter fails to in ter fere”1.
The key point here is that, re gard less of the de gree of non-in ter fer ence I may 
en joy, I am still sub ject to domi na tion, i.e. to the ar bi trary will of some one else. And 
as long as it is such an ar bi trary power that ul ti mately de cides on the de gree of in-
ter fer ence or non-in ter fer ence, it does not mat ter if it is rarely – if ever – ex er cised; 
to se curely en joy free dom in this re pub li can sense, au thor ity has to re side out side 
the ar bi trary will of men. ”What con sti tutes domi na tion is the fact that in some re-
spect the power-bearer has the ca pac ity to in ter fere ar bi trar ily, even if they are 
never go ing to do so”2.
In ex plain ing how there can be in ter fer ence with out domi na tion, on the other 
hand, Pettit ex plic itly aims at coun ter ing a ri val tra di tion, based on the Hob be sian 
con cep tion of lib erty as ab sence of co er cion. From a Hob be sian per spec tive, ”A 
Free-Man is he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, 
is not hin dered to doe what he has a will to”3. Ab sence of co er cion as con di tion for 
Hob be sian (and later, lib eral) free dom en tails, in this case, that the law it self is a 
limit on lib erty. We are free to act upon our will where the law per mits us to do so. 
And not free, where the law pro hib its us to do so. Yet from a re pub li can per spec-
tive, there is a fun da men tal dif fer ence be tween law and other forms of co er cion.
Pettit’s ar gu ment is that the claim ac cord ing to which the law, even when it is 
not based on the ar bi trary will of some one, lim its our lib erty – is mis guided. As long 
as the law is not an ex pres sion of domi na tion, it may co erce, in ter fere, but it does not 
limit lib erty. If co er cion oc curs in a con text of non-domi na tion, as for in stance, when 
a crimi nal is jailed af ter a trial that re spected ba sic guar an tees of due proc ess, it does 
not mean, ac cord ing to Pettit, that his lib erty has been di min ished4.
This claim, as we shall see, has been chal lenged by its crit ics ex ten sively. To as-
sert that only in ter fer ence that stems from an ar bi trary will lim its our lib erty, while 
co er cion by law, when it does not en tail domi na tion, does not limit free dom, is a 
po si tion that forces Pettit in a rather awk ward situa tion, that of main tain ing that 
be ing ar rested or im pris oned is not nec es sar ily a limi ta tion of lib erty. While the 
con cep tual dis tinc tion (domi na tion ver sus in ter fer ence) is clear, its coun ter in tui-
tive im pli ca tions are hard to over look. One way to es cape this co nun drum may be 
to in sist on non-domi na tion and non-in ter fer ence as rep re sent ing the core of re pub-
li can lib erty, as sev eral au thors do; or, al ter na tively, to sug gest shift ing fo cus from 
1 Philip PETTIT, Republicanism...cit., pp. 22-23.
2 Ibidem, p. 63.
3 Thomas HOBBES, Leviathan, ed. by Richard TUCK, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1990 (1651), p. 146.
4 Interference without domination, thus, occurs when officials ”can be relied upon to act on 
a non-factional basis: on a basis that is supported by non-sectional interests and ideas. They in-
terfere, since they operate on the basis of coercive law, but their interference is non-arbitrary. The 
parliament or the police officer, then, the judge or the prison warden, may practise non-domina-
ting interference, provided – and it is a big proviso – that a suitably constraining, constitutional 
arrangement works effectively. The agent or agency in question may not have any discretion in 
the treatment of a person affected, so that they cannot interfere at will, only under constitutional-
ly determined conditions” (Philip PETTIT, Republicanism...cit., p. 65).
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lib erty to auton omy, thus open ing a con cep tual con text that might have a richer 
nor ma tive po ten tial1.
Quen tin Skin ner has broadly sup ported the con cep tual re con struc tion sug-
gested by Pettit, even if with out spe cifi cally en gag ing in the lat ter’s am bi tious nor-
ma tive po liti cal theo reti cal pro ject. The no tion of lib erty that is at the core of the 
re pub li can tra di tion of po liti cal thought, ac cord ing to him, is one that is fun da men-
tally about dis tin guish ing domi na tion and in ter fer ence:
”The nerve of the re pub li can the ory can thus be ex pressed by say ing 
that it dis con nects the pres ence of un free dom from the im po si tion of in ter fer-
ence. The lack of free dom suf fered by slaves is not ba si cally due to their be-
ing con strained or in ter fered with in the ex er cise of any of their spe cific 
choices. Slaves whose choices hap pen never to fall out of con for mity with 
the will of their mas ters may be able to act with out the least in ter fer ence. 
They may there fore ap pear, para doxi cally, to be in full pos ses sion of their 
free dom, since none of their ac tions will ever be pre vented or pe nal ized. 
Such slaves nev er the less re main wholly be reft of lib erty. They re main sub ject 
to the will of their mas ters, un able to act ac cord ing to their own in de pend ent 
will at any time. They are, in other words, not agents at all” 2.
Skin ner’s strat egy for un rav el ing the re pub li can ideal of free dom is to re fer to 
the ”pre dica ment of those who rec og nize that they are liv ing in sub jec tion to the 
will of oth ers”; ”The mere fact of liv ing in such a pre dica ment has the ef fect of plac-
ing lim its on our lib erty”3.
”Those who be lieve that lib erty is noth ing more than ab sence of in ter fer-
ence are com mit ted to the view that the will is autono mous so long as it is 
nei ther threat ened nor co erced. By con trast, those who em brace the neo-Ro-
man ar gu ment deny that the will can be autono mous unless it is also free 
from in de pend ence on the will of any one else”4.
Skin ner ac knowl edges, along with Pettit, that an im por tant part of the mod ern 
po liti cal tra di tion has (mis)iden ti fied the re pub li can idea of lib erty rather as posi-
tive lib erty, lib erty as self-mas tery, or the ”lib erty of the An cients” as con ceived by 
Con stant; but while he is ada mant that the re pub li can idea of free dom seeks rather 
to se cure non-in ter fer ence, and is thus closer to the idea of a nega tive lib erty, he cer-
tainly does not dis solve it into the lib eral con cep tion of free dom ei ther.
To be sure, this in flu en tial mis con struc tion of the neo-Ro man un der stand ing 
of free dom which is de vel oped within the ”Ber lin-Con stant frame work” is due 
to a sig nifi cant ex tent, ac cord ing to Pettit, to the in flu ence of Rous seau: le ci toyen 
de Genève’s hos til ity to wards po liti cal rep re sen ta tion and in sis tence on lib erty as 
de moc ratic self-rule places him at odds with most other re pub li can mod ern po-
liti cal think ers. And it will be this par ticu lar ver sion, cou pled with a neo-Athe nian 
1 On the possibility that autonomy, civic virtue and rights can be linked within a political 
theory that ”marries” republicanism and liberalism, see Richard DAGGER, Civic Virtues…cit.
2 Quentin SKINNER, ”Freedom as the Absence of Arbitrary Power”, in Cecile LABORDE, 
John MAYNOR (eds.), Republicanism…cit., pp. 89-90.
3 IDEM, ”A Third Concept of Liberty”, Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. 117, no. 237, 
2001, pp. 237-268.
4 Ibidem.
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con cep tion of self-mas tery, rather than the neo-Ro man un der stand ing of non-domi-
na tion, that will in spire most of his pos ter ity’s at ti tude to wards re pub li can ism 
and its equa tion with posi tive lib erty or the lib erty of the An cients. Yet neo re pub li-
can ism, as ex plic itly or im plic itly as sumed by Skin ner, Pettit and oth ers, is de lib er-
ately rooted in the Ro man re pub li can tra di tion and its po liti cal in sti tu tions, with 
Cicero as in tel lec tual ref er ence, rather than in a vir tues-ori ented con cep tion of the 
good life forged through po liti cal par tici pa tion.
In this con text, then, the ef fort to dis tin guish the neo re pub li can ideal of lib-
erty from the wider used no tion of posi tive lib erty gains its true sig nifi cance, and 
un der stand ing the con cep tual and in sti tu tional con text of non-domi na tion be-
comes a cru cial task of re pub li can (or neo-Ro man) schol ar ship. Fur ther more, Vi-
roli1 and Skin ner’s stud ies on clas si cal re pub li can ism help us grasp the dif fer ence 
be tween what Ma chia velli held as mean ing vero viv ere libero e civile and what a 
maxi mal ist ver sion of po liti cal par tici pa tion, or a de mand ing con cep tion of 
self-mas tery, re quire.
Free dom from ar bi trary in ter fer ence may be best se cured by in sti tu tional ar-
range ments that al low for po liti cal par tici pa tion – but can not be dis solved into the 
re quire ment of par tici pa tion and self-rule. As Pettit ar gues, fol low ing Skin ner and 
Hanna Pit kin, the ro man no tion of lib er tas was ”pre domi nantly nega tive”. This 
repre sents an im por tant con cep tual point that these au thors per sis tently ad vance: 
nei ther Cicero, nor Ma chia velli, nor the mod ern re pub li cans saw ”achiev ing par-
tici pa tion” as more than an in stru men tal – how ever im por tant – choice for se cur-
ing ”avoid ance of ar bi trary in ter fer ence”. Nei ther a nec es sary con di tion for 
re pub li can free dom nor its proper con tent, po liti cal par tici pa tion repre sents only 
part of the lar ger, com plex prob lem atic of pre vent ing the dis so lu tion of re pub li can 
rule into ar bi trary power.
In Pettit and Skin ner’s ac counts, the dis place ment by 19th cen tury lib er al ism of 
the re pub li can themes has been so pow er ful, and so ef fec tive, that not only non-co-
er cion re placed non-domi na tion as the fa vored un der stand ing of lib erty, but also – 
and proba bly more im por tantly – the mean ing it self of re pub li can free dom has 
been dis torted2. First for got ten and then mis con strued, this third con cept of lib erty 
is now draw ing again the at ten tion of the in tel lec tual his to ri ans and repre sents the 
hub of po liti cal theo rists’ neo re pub li can agenda. And in or der to ren der the re pub-
li can ideal visi ble again, the task of con cep tual clari fi ca tion has to be ac com pa nied 
by a sig nifi cant body of nor ma tive po liti cal theo reti cal ac counts3.
1 Maurizio VIROLI, Machiavelli, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998; IDEM, ”Machiavelli 
and the Republican Idea of Politics”, in Gisela BOCK, Maurizio VIROLI, Quentin SKINNER 
(eds.), Machiavelli…cit., pp. 143-172.
2 ”While it is true that republican thinkers in general regarded democratic participation or 
representation as a safeguard of liberty, not as its defining core, the growing emphasis on demo-
cracy did lead some individuals away from traditional alignments and towards the full populist 
position of holding that liberty consists in nothing more or less than democratic self-rule” (Philip 
PETTIT, Republicanism...cit., p. 30).
3 Recent work in this direction includes Richard BELLAMY, Political Constitutionalism. A 
Republican Defense of the Constitutionality of Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2007; Cass R. SUNSTEIN, Free Markets and Social Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997; 
IDEM, Designing Democracy. What Constitutions Do, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002; Iseult 
HONOHAN, ”Friends, Strangers, or Countrymen? The Ties between Citizens and Colleagues”, 
Political Studies, vol. 49, no. 1, 2001, pp. 51-69.
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Against the Re pub li can Re vival
Sev eral ave nues of con tes ta tion are open to crit ics of neo re pub li can ism and, 
more gen er ally, of the re newed in tel lec tual and po liti cal in ter est in the re pub li can 
tra di tion. One would be to deny that the con trast be tween re pub li can and lib eral 
free doms was ac tu ally one that the clas si cal au thors to which Skin ner and Pettit re-
fer, did or would ever ac knowl edge1. Or, to say that the con tem po rary con trast be-
tween nega tive and re pub li can lib erty is ei ther ex ag ger ated2 or nor ma tively 
in sig nifi cant. Still an other way to con test the re pub li can ideal is to grant the dis tinct-
ive ness of ”lib erty as non-domi na tion”, yet to de cry its nor ma tive im pli ca tions. Fi-
nally, crit ics may claim that it sim ply is not a rich con cept enough in or der to fit 
within the prob lem atic of con tem po rary poli tics.
Robert E. Goodin of fers an ac count that re ca pitu lates a large part of the ar gu-
ments criti cal of re pub li can ism. In his es say on the ”Fo lie Ré pub li caine”, he claims 
that mod ern po liti cal ide olo gies such as lib er al ism or na tion al ism have gradu ally 
dis placed re pub li can ism for a good rea son: they con trib uted to a lar ger de gree 
and with bet ter suited an swers to the po liti cal ques tions that re pub li can ism origi-
nally as pired to ad dress. Self-rule, mixed gov ern ment, and even the con tent of re-
pub li can free dom are dis cussed within these (com para tively newer) po liti cal 
ide olo gies in ways that make re pub li can an swer seem, at best, re dun dant.
Na tion al ism, for in stance, has re cently pro vided rea sons sup port ing self-rule 
that are far more ef fec tive than re pub li can ism’s rhe tori cal and con cep tual ap pa ra-
tus. And the rea son is fa mil iar to con tem po rary schol ars of na tion al ism stud ies: in-
stead of re ly ing on a form of pa tri ot ism that re pub li cans de scribe – namely, trust 
and pride in the val ues and prac tices al ready em bod ied in the po liti cal in sti tu tions 
of a coun try – na tion al ism claims self-rule and na tion-build ing on the ba sis of sub-
sum ing ”pri mor dial [that is, tribal] sen ti ments to some newly con structed na-
tional ide als and iden ti ties”3. These con structed com mon al ities, ”in vented shared 
tra di tions” and ”con cocted new iden ti ties” (rather than the val ues al ready sig ni-
fied by ex ist ing po liti cal in sti tu tions), as well as the ral ly ing cry for home rule 
(rather than non-domi na tion) rep re sented the more suc cess ful ap proaches to 
self-rule in mod ern and con tem po rary times4.
Mixed gov ern ment, on the other hand, has been theo rized by John Locke as 
ex ten sively and sub tly as by Mon tes quieu, ac cord ing to Goodin; there is, in other 
words, noth ing in re pub li can po liti cal thought that makes it the unique source of 
im por tant no tions such as that of mixed con sti tu tion. The in sti tu tional ar range-
ments of bal anc ing pow ers that mod ern re pub li can po liti cal thought privi leges 
can be de fended with equal, if not more stam ina and con sis tency by po liti cal phi-
loso phies other than re pub li can ism.
Fur ther ing the point that con tem po rary re pub li can ism is, at best, rather re-
dun dant and lacks any se ri ous con cep tual and nor ma tive origi nal ity, Goodin goes 
1 See Eric GHOSH, ”From Republican to Liberal Liberty”, History of Political Thought, vol. 29, 
no. 1, 2008, pp. 132-167.
2 Matthew H. KRAMER, The Quality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003.
3 Robert E. GOODIN, ”Folie Républicaine”, cit., p. 58.
4 ”Thus, self-government – understood as the rejection of foreign crowns and imperial 
apron strings – can be, and has been, defended on many different grounds. Republicanism is one. 
But historically (and certainly in contemporary history) it has been a distinctly minor theme – and 
understandably so” (Ibidem).
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on to in voke John Rawls and his oft-cited state ment that the clas si cal lib er al ism of 
the sort that is at the cen ter of in tel lec tual his to ri ans’ pro ject of re pub li can re vival 
(which re jects, as we have seen, a strong no tion of posi tive lib erty) is ”fully com-
pati ble with po liti cal lib er al ism”. Since Rawls him self ex plic itly de nies any se ri-
ous op po si tion be tween clas si cal re pub li can ism and not only his own con cep tion 
of po liti cal lib er al ism (with which it is ”fully com pati ble”), but also with the lib er-
al ism of Con stant and Ber lin, it is dif fi cult to see, from Goodin’s per spec tive, what 
se ri ous in tel lec tual in ter est we may con tinue to en cour age in the new est it era tions 
re pub li can po liti cal thought. Even con sid era tions of po liti cal par tici pa tion are cus-
tom ary among lib eral theo rists; both the need and the rea sons for par tici pa tion are 
ac knowl edged by lib er als but, as most re pub li cans, they dis agree on the scope and 
the mag ni tude of this re quire ment.
Bren nan and Lo masky, how ever, adopt a dif fer ent view of what re pub li can-
ism stands for, and one that they ul ti mately dis miss. They main tain that in their 
own un der stand ing of the re pub li can set of ide als, ”po liti cal par tici pa tion ought 
to be re garded as in trin si cally valu able”. Re pub li cans
”are in clined to ap peal to a broadly Ar is to te lian un der stand ing of hu man be-
ings as po liti cal ani mals and will ob serve that liv ing to gether with one’s fel-
lows is not some thing un der taken merely as a ve hi cle for ul te rior ends, but 
rather is a (ma jor) com po nent of liv ing well. Po liti cal com mu nity is friend ship 
writ large […] To par tici pate in po liti cal de lib era tions is not, on this ac count, 
en tirely or even pri mar ily a means con du cive to achiev ing those pri vate ends 
to which one is drawn. Rather, it is it self for most peo ple an ac tiv ity in dis pen-
sa ble for ade quate ex pres sion of their na ture as hu man be ings”1.
This con cep tion of po liti cal par tici pa tion as in dis pen sa ble for the ade quate ex-
pres sion of hu man na ture is cer tainly part of some of the his tory of re pub li can po-
liti cal thought. Nev er the less, this neo-Ar is to te lian strand which con tin ues to 
in spire con tem po rary theo rists such as Charles Tay lor or Mi chael San del is bal-
anced by a neo-Ro man po liti cal tra di tion in which the le gal and in sti tu tional con-
text for re pub li can lib erty has as much im por tance as the re flec tion on hu man 
na ture. What Lo masky and Bren nan seem to over look, then, is pre cisely the com-
plex role of po liti cal de lib era tion and par tici pa tion in the neo-Ro man re pub li can2 
ac counts; in stead of be ing based on a view of in di vidu als as ra tional agents that ex-
change rea sons, neo re pub li can ism in this per spec tive points to wards a wider re-
flec tion on the rhe tori cal con text of po liti cal per sua sion, and this con text has 
pro duced a radi cally dif fer ent en vi ron ment for po liti cal par tici pa tion and de lib era-
tion. I will re turn to these con sid era tions be low.
The re pub li can no tion of free dom as non-domi na tion has it self been at tacked 
from a num ber of per spec tives3. It is re duced by Goodin, in his in ter pre ta tion of 
1 Geoffrey BRENNAN, Loren LOMASKY, ”Against Reviving Republicanism”, cit, p. 230-231.
2 Skinner himself states that he would prefer to replace “republican” with ”neo-Roman” alto-
gether. See Quentin SKINNER, ”Freedom…cit.”, pp. 83-101.
3 ”Republican freedom is simply resilient non-interference. If this is what republican freedom 
consists in, then in my view the most that can be attributed to Skinner and Pettit is a useful set of 
empirical hypotheses (which point to certain sets of institutional arrangements) about how liberty 
is best to be maximized (or maximally equalized, or perhaps even maximinned). If I am right about 
this, then the difference between republicans and liberals is an empirical rather than a conceptual 
one, and the supposed difference over the meaning of ‘constraints on freedom’ is an illusion”, in 
Ian CARTER, A Measure of Freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 238-239.
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Pettit’s the ory, to the idea of se cur ing non-in ter fer ence. But this ”re sil ient lib-
erty”, Goodin claims, is no where dif fer ent than lib erty it self, and not a dis tinct 
kind of lib erty. If free dom as non-domi na tion is just a way of se cur ing free dom as 
non-in ter fer ence (se cur ing nega tive lib erty, in other words), then the re pub li can 
lib erty can not be based on a third con cept, but is the same lib eral con cept of nega-
tive lib erty.
I deem dif fi cult to ac cept the plau si bil ity of Goodin’s cate gori cal dis missal of 
free dom as non-domi na tion. While the re pub li can con cept of free dom has its own 
dif fi cul ties, they are not nec es sar ily the same that Goodin iden ti fies. He seems to 
dis card too eas ily the es sence of the dis tinc tion be tween domi na tion and in ter fer-
ence and hence the spe cific form of non-in ter fer ence that re pub li cans are con-
cerned with. More over, his ar gu ment re volves around the idea that de sir ing X, 
and de sir ing that X lasts as long as pos si ble, con sti tute the same pref er ence:
”If I think X is good, then en joy ing X for a longer time rather than a 
shorter time must be good. That does not mean I value two sepa rate things 
(time and X), nor does it mean that I value X in some spe cial tem po rally ex-
tended way. It is merely in the na ture of valu ing X that more of X is bet ter 
than less, and that more time with X is bet ter than less”1.
Even on Goodin’s un der stand ing of non in ter fer ence, there is a pos si bil ity that 
one might en joy it while at the same time ac cept ing later in ter fer ence if cer tain con-
di tions ap ply. I en joy auton omy, for in stance, yet I ac cept that in a fu ture time my 
auton omy should be re strained – say, if I get drunk in a party and I try to drive 
home. On the purely nega tive con cept of free dom, any such re straint is di min ish-
ing free dom. On the non-domi na tion un der stand ing of free dom sug gested by 
Pettit, such re strain en hances and se cures the ex er cise of free dom. Whether it is re-
pub li can or lib eral free dom that has a more ap peal ing nor ma tive po ten tial, they 
are clearly dis tinct no tions.
Re pub li can ism and De lib era tion
Fi nally, Goodin di rects most of his re mark able ana lyti cal re sources to wards 
un der min ing what he con sid ers the most se ri ous ap peal of re pub li can ism to day: 
the idea of re pub lics as ”self-gov ern ing com mu ni ties, de lib era tive bod ies with out 
any fixed heads”. Ac cord ing to him, it is this re pub li cans’ pen chant for a cer tain 
ideal of de lib era tion and par tici pa tion that con sti tutes the veri ta ble source of the con-
tem po rary in ter est in the ”re pub li can re vival”. Cru cially though, the ”club house-” 
or ”board room de lib era tions” that char ac ter ized ear lier re pub li can com mu ni ties 
are im pos si ble to re pro duce to day. And with an in creas ingly cate gori cal ver dict, it 
is more than just spe cific kinds of de lib era tion that Goodin views as im pos si ble; 
but ac tu ally, any de lib era tion ”in a popu lous re pub lic”2.
The main tar get of Goodin’s pow er ful criti cism be comes, for the re main der of 
his es say, a strongly par tici pa tory ver sion of de lib era tive de moc racy that he iden ti fies 
1 Robert E. GOODIN, ”Folie Républicaine”, cit., p. 61.
2 Ibidem, p. 66.
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as the main form that neo re pub li can ism adopts to day – or has to em brace in or der to 
re claim any re pub li can cre den tials. I con tend that Goodin’s criti cism is war ranted 
if un der stood as tar get ing par tici pa tory de lib era tive de moc racy, which in my 
mind too, has im por tant lim its and se ri ous in con sis ten cies. Yet I con test his claim 
that neo re pub li can ism pre domi nantly takes this par tici pa tory de lib era tive de moc-
ratic form, which he iden ti fies as ”popu list re pub li can ism”.
Ac cord ing to the way in which their cur rent choices are framed by Goodin, 
re pub li cans are bound to be ei ther popu list re pub li cans, i.e. par tici pa tory de lib-
era tive de moc rats, or pro po nents of an ”oli gar chic model of rep re sen ta tive de lib-
era tion”. Yet by pos tu lat ing this di chot omy, I con tend, he misses the par ticu lar ity 
of the neo re pub li can pro ject, which cer tainly can not eas ily be as so ci ated with the 
con cept of pub lic rea son that con sti tutes the core idea in most re cent de lib era tive 
de moc ratic ac counts.
Con tem po rary re pub li can ism is rooted rather in the neo-Ro man po liti cal tra-
di tion – one that in te grates the re flec tion on po liti cal in sti tu tions and lib erty with 
the con text of per sua sion among free men – i.e., with the con text of rheto ric. Pre-
cisely by pay ing due at ten tion to the rhe tori cal con text of po liti cal per sua sion in re-
pub lics, many neo re pub li cans dis tance them selves from the strongly ra tion al is tic 
pro ject that in forms most of the re cent schol ar ship on de lib era tive de moc racy. The 
anti-rhe tori cal bias of the lat ter is sa li ent and struc tural, ul ti mately plac ing such ac-
counts into a sharp an tago nism with the re pub li can po liti cal in tui tions.
Para doxi cally, Goodin him self sev ers the sup pos edly nec es sary con cep tual 
link be tween re pub li can ism and par tici pa tory de lib era tive de moc racy. In the frag-
ment be low, he ac knowl edges that most writ ings on de lib era tive de moc racy seem 
to be oblivi ous of re pub li can ism and its in tel lec tual ori gins:
”Scan the in di ces of all the ma jor re cent works on ’de lib era tive de moc-
racy’. No tice that the term re pub li can ism is miss ing from vir tu ally all of them. 
It is no where em ployed posi tively in Haber mas’ Be tween Facts and Norms 
(1996); and it is no where to be found in Rawls’s ’Idea of Pub lic Rea son Re vis-
ited’ (1997), no where in Gut mann & Thomp son’s De moc racy and Dis agree ment 
(1996), no where in Young’s In clu sion and De moc racy (2000), no where in 
Dryzek’s De lib era tive De moc racy and Be yond (2000)”1.
Yet af ter list ing im por tant (al beit very dis pa rate) works on par tici pa tion and 
de lib era tion which are in deed un re lated to the con tem po rary re pub li can pro ject, 
Goodin fails to draw the ap pro pri ate con clu sion: con tem po rary neo re pub li can ism 
and re cent par tici pa tory de lib era tive de moc racy theo ries have a cru cially dif fer ent 
pedi gree. De lib era tion and par tici pa tion have an im por tant, yet rela tive, or in stru-
men tal role in the neo-Ro man tra di tion: no where in this tra di tion is the de lib era-
tive di men sion of poli tics pos tu lated as an in trin sic part of a strongly epis temic 
con cep tion of pub lic po liti cal jus ti fi ca tion.
This is not to say that re pub li cans are in sen si ble to the vir tues of ei ther pub lic 
de lib era tion or po liti cal par tici pa tion. Nor that they do not se ri ously pon der on 
the in sti tu tional and nor ma tive cir cum stances that sup port them. But they gen er-
ally ad vo cate a view of de lib era tion that is ba si cally at odds with what emerges 
from the cur rent ac counts of par tici pa tory de lib era tive de moc rats. In what fol-
lows, I at tempt to de tail the dif fer ences.
1 Ibidem, p. 68. 
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In the words of Joshua Cohen,
”The con cep tion of jus ti fi ca tion that pro vides the core of the ideal of 
de lib era tive de moc racy can be cap tured in an ideal pro ce dure of po liti cal 
de lib era tion. In such a pro ce dure par tici pants re gard one an other as equals; 
they aim to de fend and criti cize in sti tu tions and pro grams in terms of con sid-
era tions that oth ers have rea son to ac cept, given the fact of rea son able plu ral-
ism and the as sump tion that those oth ers are rea son able; and they are 
pre pared to co op er ate in ac cor dance with the re sults of such dis cus sion, treat-
ing those re sults as au thori ta tive”1.
On Philip Pettit’s own un der stand ing of the ideal of de lib era tive de moc racy, 
there are three con straints that de fine it: a con straint of in clu siv ity, that stipu lates 
that all mem bers of the po liti cal com mu nity have a right to vote on the col lec tive 
is sues; a judg mental con straint, ac cord ing to which mem bers should de lib er ate 
about de ci sions on the ba sis of ”pre sump tively com mon con cerns”; and a dia logi-
cal con straint, which re quires that the de lib era tions are un der taken as ”open and 
un forced dia logue”2. To re call Cohen,
”The main idea is that the de lib era tive con cep tion re quires more than 
that the in ter ests of oth ers be given equal con sid era tion; it de mands, too, that 
we find po liti cally ac cept able rea sons – rea sons that are ac cept able to oth ers, 
given a back ground of dif fer ences of con sci en tious con vic tion”3 .
Col lec tive po liti cal de ci sions in pub lic justi fi ca tory ac counts are le giti mate so 
long as they sat isfy the cri te ria of pub lic, im par tial de lib era tions. Each sub ject or 
par tici pant to the po liti cal jus ti fi ca tion proc ess has the duty to pro duce pub lic rea-
sons for his ar gu ments, and to lis ten to such rea sons from the oth ers.
”Which con sid era tions count as rea sons? […] In an ide al ized de lib era-
tive set ting, it will not do sim ply to ad vance rea sons that one takes to be true 
or com pel ling: such con sid era tions may be re jected by oth ers who are them-
selves rea son able. One must in stead find rea sons that are com pel ling to oth-
ers, ac knowl edg ing those oth ers as equals, aware that they have al ter na tive 
rea son able com mit ments, and know ing some thing about the kinds of com mit-
ments that they are likely to have –for ex am ple, that they may have moral or 
re li gious com mit ments that im pose what they take to be over rid ing ob li ga-
tions. If a con sid era tion does not meet these tests, that will suf fice for re ject ing 
it as a rea son. If it does, then it counts as an ac cept able po liti cal rea son.”4
The ca pac ity to for mu late such ar gu ments is some times (but not nec es sar ily) 
placed at the ab stract level of ra tional agents, per form ing hy po theti cal moral-po-
liti cal de lib era tions. These hy po theti cal de lib era tions among, for in stance, agents 
1 Joshua COHEN, ”Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy”, in James BOHMAN, William 
REHG (eds.), Deliberative Democracy. Essays on Reason and Politics, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 
1997, pp. 413-414.
2 Philip PETTIT, ”Deliberative Democracy, the Discursive Dilemma, and Republican Theory”, 
in James FISKIN, Peter LASLETT (eds.), Debating Deliberative Democracy, Blackwell, Oxford, 2003, 
p. 138.
3 Joshua COHEN, ”Deliberation…cit.”, p. 417.
4 Ibidem, p. 414.
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placed in a per fect equal ity and mu tual sym me try (fic tional en ti ties that rep re sent 
us, real per sons) are con structed ei ther as ”ideal speech situa tions” in Haber mas’ 
ac count1, or as the ”origi nal po si tion” for John Rawls2.
This ab stract, hy po theti cal level of de lib era tion among agents of fers the de-
par ture point for the po liti cal jus ti fi ca tion – and, at the same time, the cri te ria of 
epis temic and nor ma tive va lid ity – of the ethi cal-po liti cal prin ci ples that should 
gov ern us. Real-life bar gain ing be tween un equally situ ated in di vidu als ought not 
to be ac cepted as such a source for nor ma tiv ity, since it does not cor re spond to the 
prem ise of equal ity among the sub jects of po liti cal jus ti fi ca tion. Ex ist ing ine quali-
ties of in come and wealth, re sources, pres tige, or edu ca tion/in for ma tion would 
lead to stra te gic po si tion ing of par tici pants (”stra te gic ac tion”, in the lan guage of 
Haber mas) such that ”ne go tia tions” would end in a ”com pro mise” (which has an 
in varia bly de pre cia tory con no ta tion). In other words, pre sent in jus tices would be 
trans ferred, through the in cor rectly de signed pro ce dure (bar gain ing), and would 
de ter mine the il le giti macy of the prin ci ples so cho sen. For that rea son, an ade-
quate pro ce dure of de lib era tion pre sup poses not only po liti cal equal ity, but also 
stronger forms of equal ity that can usu ally be achieved only as at trib utes of a hy-
po theti cal choice-situa tion.
Cicero’s dis tinc tion be tween con ver sa tion and ora tory is still valid and ap-
plies to the pre sent con tro versy. While con ver sa tion is meant to dis cover truth, ora-
tory is meant to in spire po liti cal de ci sion. Much of the cur rent pub lic de lib era tory 
theo riz ing ap pears geared up to dis solv ing the lat ter into the for mer. Yet by tak ing 
se ri ously, from a nor ma tive per spec tive, the rhe tori cal con text of po liti cal de ci-
sion-mak ing, we can bet ter un der stand the in sti tu tional con di tions of neo-Ro man 
po liti cal the ory. Such ”cir cum stances of rheto ric” con fer mean ings to the ora tor’s 
ef fort of per sua sion, as well as to the pub lic’s role in de ci sion-mak ing. In other 
words, po liti cal rheto ric makes sense only in cer tain par ticu lar cir cum stances, 
within a par ticu lar kind of po liti cal com mu nity, and sup ported by cer tain par ticu-
lar in sti tu tions3.
In pub lic de lib era tive ac counts po liti cal le giti macy is un der stood as a con cept 
whose con tent de pends on the man ner in which we con struct a pro ce dure of ra-
tional de lib era tion and ar gu men ta tion. Rhe tori cal po liti cal de lib era tions, ob vi-
ously, can not con sti tute pro ce dures that en sure the epis temic cer ti fi ca tion of re sults. 
Even more, ac cord ing to Haber mas they amount to noth ing less than ”pa tholo gies 
of com mu ni ca tion”4. Yet, de spite their pro ce dural epis temic un re li abil ity, from a po-
liti cal point of view, they – cru cially – re place vio lence and make pos si ble po liti cal 
ac tion. Rhe tori cal com mu ni ca tion gen er ates, and nour ishes it self from, am biva-
lence, am bi gu ity, in cer ti tude, but this is the na ture of fu ture it self – at least in its po-
liti cal di men sion. Rhe tori cal de lib era tions, in the Ar is to te lian tra di tion, con cern 
pre cisely those choices be tween al ter na tive ac tions that de fine the fu ture, choices that 
are im preg nated with vari ous de grees of un cer tainty and im pre ci sion. Or, pre cisely 
1 Jürgen HABERMAS, The Theory of Communicative Action, 2 vols., transl. by Th. McCarthy, 
Beacon Press, Boston, 1987.
2 John RAWLS, Political Liberalism, 2nd ed., Columbia University Press, New York, 2005.
3 Brian GARSTEN, Saving Persuasion. A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006.
4 Jürgen HABERMAS, ”Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still 
Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research”, Com-
munication Theory, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 411-426.
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in this con text, trust, per sonal char ac ter emo tions and pas sions, be come le giti mate 
ele ments of po liti cal per sua sion that should ground col lec tive de ci sions.
Seen from this per spec tive, neo re pub li can nor ma tive theo riz ing at tempts to 
elabo rate pre cisely the nor ma tive and in sti tu tional set ting in which de lib era tion that 
does not ex clude po liti cal rhe tori cal per sua sion among free citi zens, makes sense. 
From this an gle, more over, the much-dis cussed mo ti va tional prob lem of re pub li can-
ism may turn out to be of a lesser im por tance. Since nei ther a strongly ra tion al ist con-
cep tion of pub lic de lib era tion nor a radi cal im pera tive of po liti cal par tici pa tion are 
nec es sary for the clas si cal and cur rent re pub li can nor ma tive con struc tions, the ques-
tion of mo ti va tion and need for vir tu ous citi zens up hold ing the com mon good can 
be re con sid ered. The prob lem of mo ti va tion ap plies in deed to the par tici pa tory de-
lib era tive ac counts pre cisely be cause of their con cep tual ex clu sion of rhe tori cal per-
sua sion from the le giti mate ele ments of po liti cal jus ti fi ca tion. De lib era tive de moc rats 
ap pear to ig nore the prob lem of mo ti va tion when pro pos ing cri te ria of ad mis si bil ity 
for citi zens’ pref er ences and ar gu ments, cri te ria that em body high stan dards of mo ral-
ity and ra tion al ity. More over, most ad vo cates of pub lic de lib era tion have seemed to 
over look the ten sion that ex ists be tween re quir ing wider po liti cal par tici pa tion and 
im pos ing more de mand ing cri te ria for ad mit ting in di vidu als’ ar gu ments in the justi-
fi ca tory proc ess. The prob lem of mo ti va tion is thus re lated to the (ul ti mately ex clu-
sion ary) cri te ria of epis temic jus ti fi ca tion, and much less to a neo-Ro man po liti cal 
the ory that can not ab jure its roots in a le giti mate re flec tion on the role of rhe tori cal 
de lib era tions and the con di tions for non-domi na tion.
Ac cord ing to Haber mas, a test re gard ing mo ti va tion is al ready built into the de-
lib era tive-justi fi ca tory pro ce dure: citi zens who con sider them selves un able to sup-
port a par ticu lar norm can sim ply re ject that norm in the de lib era tion proc ess. Yet, 
such an an swer seems to mis un der stand the bar rier that de lib era tive pro ce dural ism 
it self erects against tak ing mo ti va tion se ri ously: lack of mo ti va tion could sim ply be 
as simi lated to per sonal bias and hence ex cluded from ac cept able rea sons. But more 
im por tantly, Haber mas’s pro ce dural so lu tion may ad dress the prob lem of keep ing 
citi zens who are al ready en gaged in the de lib era tive proc ess, moti va tion ally in-
volved. Yet it does noth ing to ex plain how and why would citi zens adopt and par-
tici pate to such re stric tive de lib era tive pro ce dures in the first place.
As it emerges, much of the criti cism that Goodin, Bren nan and Lo masky ap-
plies in fact to par tici pa tory- and de lib era tive de moc rats’ pro ce dural ac counts, as 
long as neo re pub li cans fol low a dis tinct iden tity that in te grates the con text of rhe-
tori cal po liti cal per sua sion among free citi zens. It is true, then, that pub lic de lib era-
tion theo rists ”can’t have it all”1: po liti cal par tici pa tion, pub lic rea son, de moc ratic 
in clu sion, im par ti al ity, mo ti va tion, and epis temic vali da tion. Fur ther more, many 
of the de lib era tive de moc ratic ac counts seem to have set tled on a par ticu lar for mu-
la tion of the na ture, or es sence, of the po liti cal: we should en gage in poli tics, ac cord-
ing to these ac counts, pri mar ily as truth seek ers. Neo-Ro man po liti cal the ory could 
not as sume such a strong epis temic stance. Yet for many con tem po rary re pub li can 
po liti cal theo rists, the dis tance that sepa rates them from de lib era tive ver sions of 
par tici pa tory de moc racy seems to be still un clear; they risk try ing to merge the two 
in com pati ble tra di tions, and such dis so lu tion would cer tainly be a pity.
1 Gerald GAUS, ”Reason, Justification, and Consensus: Why Democracy Can’t Have It All”, 
in James BOHMAN, William REHG (eds.), Deliberative Democracy…cit., pp. 205-242.
